Subjectivity as a construct

(Originally written in December 2021.)

In a previous post I explored some arguments about whether we have direct access to qualia. I was trying to figure out whether there are entities within our direct experience, and whether that undermines aspects of Deutsch and Popper’s philosophy, as well as whether it has implications for which beings are conscious.

After writing that post, a remark by Jake Orthwein gave me a subtle but important shift in perspective. When I asked him the question of direct experience, his immediate answer was: the question assumes a subject-object distinction prevalent in Deutschian thinking, which may not be true.

Throughout all my rumination, I hadn’t realized the extent to which I was taking the very ideas of subjectivity and objectivity for granted. When I ask whether we have direct access to qualia, I’m assuming that there is this distinct entity – the subject – that may or may not have direct access to something, and also that this entity is a part of a wider objective world. I imagine this paradigm goes at least as far back as Descartes, for whom the one fact that could not be disputed was the existence of a subject (namely, onself).

But I don’t think the subject-object dichotomy is necessarily inherent in reality or required for our epistemology. Subjectivity can be seen as something that emerges out of a subjectless world, rather than a fundamental premise for our epistemology.